Date: 1 May 2001
From: James R Burch
I recent read your historical piece on the 'Incident at VC lake.' I am James R. Burch II, LTC, USA, (retired) and wish to correct some of the information. My call sign was Crusader33, the cobra that went down that day. Your article indicated the downed cobra was Crusader32. Crusader32 was there that day, but did not go down. There is no Crusader29 since all gun call signs begin with 30. (Scouts are 10's and slicks are 20's. This was standard for Cavalry units.) It was probably Midget McJohnston (CR39). The unit was D troop 3/5 Air Cav (LightHorse -- also called the Bastard Cav) stationed at Vinh Long and attached to 7/1st Cav Squadron. The 187th AHC was stationed at Tay Ninh, much further north. Their Crusaders were slicks while their guns were the Rat Pack. I don't think they ever operated in IV Corps to my knowledge. I was in country 19 Jan 70 and left 19 Jan 71. I was a fire team leader that day.Prior to the action at VC lake, the troop had been on a recce mission operating out of Rach Soi/Rach Gia area west of the Tram. We received a Tac-E (tactical emergency) order to redeploy immediately to Ca Mau to support the recovery of downed Tigers/Vikings (121st AHC). Upon arrival with the entire cav package (4 cobras, 4 scouts, 4 slicks), we witnessed the recover of a Huey (Tiger or Viking I think) with one gunner hanging on a monkey strap below the aircraft. Then a gun ship (Seawolf I think) came in with tail rotor jammed. They made a running landing and slid off into the barbed wire and engineer stakes. Obviously, this one was going to be hot.
Mission commander got an intel and sitrep update. He ordered the scouts to stay behind and sent 4 Crusaders (AH-1Gs) to cover medevac and Dustoff missions. You may be aware of the difference, but Dustoff was protected by Geneva Convention with their red crosses, while a medevac was a standard slick doing the same thing. We used our own medevacs rather than Dustoff for our own operations normally. But I have covered many Dustoff missions throughout IV Corps. We had been told that the Seawolves had already recovered their crews and to focus on extracting the WIA/KIA from the other downed aircraft. Additionally, we were to cover the insertion of more ground troops to secure the area and entrap the enemy elements.
After attacking several machine gun emplacements near the downed Tigers, we began covering individual Dustoff missions in. They told us they were having trouble extracting some bodies from one crash site. They were badly entangled with the wreckage. We were suppressing heavy MG's while Huey guns (Seawolves/Vikings) provided close-in escort to Dustoff aircraft. We were attacking from a higher than normal altitude to get a better angle on the heavy MGs. That kept our speed up throughout the gun run and the climb out. With 4 guns working together, we hoped to keep plenty of fire power going into their enemy positions with a continuous orbit. Three of us were flying light hogs (54-2.75FFARs, 4000 rds minigun, 400 rds 40mm) and one heavy hog (76 rockets, 800rds - 40mm). We had worked one snake low and 2 high in Cambodia during the invasion, but, with the number of heavy and light MGs, it was decided to keep all four high to cover each other. With the close-in escort, it made more sense to keep the heavy MGs occupied and destroy them. The Huey is much better at such close escort with their door gunners. If we kept the heavy MGs off the Dustoffs and their escorts, we figured they'd get in and out in one piece.
I observed some Black Ponies in an orbit over us. Did not see
them attack. Also saw some F-4's in an even higher orbit. This action was getting a lot of attention apparently.At one point, Dustoff 82(?) called taking heavy hits. I was just breaking right into a climb when I saw him break sharply. I instinctively broke left back to immediately re-engaged positions along the tree line from which he was turning. At that point, my aircraft started yawing badly back and forth and had no tail rotor control. I
chopped power and entered an autorotation to a rice paddy. That stabilized the yawing. I called going down and my wing followed me. As I was decelerating to land, I saw and heard a Dustoff 80(?) turning towards me. Landing in the muddy rice paddy was uneventful, but the aircraft sank up to its belly in the soft and watery mud. I quickly shutdown the aircraft while my copilot exited to provide local security, took our survival equipment and the log book to the waiting Dustoff. Our rotors were barely stopped when we pulled out. My copilot and I laid down suppressive fires with our
automatic rifles on the way out. Dustoff dropped us at a local RF/PF compound.Later that night (2200L hrs) one of our slicks came and picked us up for a return flight to Vinh Long. The aircraft was recovered the next day. I was to have been off that day, but my roomy, Bob Allen (CR37) was not up to it. So I took his mission in his aircraft 158. It was now full of bullet holes.
Additionally, I'd like to make a few comments about some topics mentioned in other parts of your outstanding web site. The Army aviation evolved away from extensive use of Birddog O-1 FAC aircraft when we began to use dedicated armed scout helicopters in pairs. Scouts could locate and engage targets that a FAC would never be able to find. Their firepower was not that much less than a Huey gunship and more maneuverable. Consequently, the FAC was used in an economy of force
effort to cover more of the AO. The FAC covered areas not being reconned by cavalry troops. These assignments were deconflicted daily by squadron with the 164th Group. Likewise, Army air cav units were advised of generally where the Navy units were operating so as not to duplicate coverage. My troop often responded to FAC located activity. They also provided comms relay when needed to coordinate with squadron HQ especially when we operated in the Tram, U Minh Forest or Cambodia.The troop operated occasionally off the JATO Boat near Chau Duc. The
first time was an interesting experience. After landing on the deck, the ordancemen asked what we needed. When I told him 50 17-lb rockets,
3000 rds of minigun, and 300 rds of 40 mm just for my ship, his eyes got real big. My wing man needed a similar amount. The best part was
being provided some sandwiches at the same time. We usually rearmed ourselves, but the ordancemen made quick work getting us back into the
air as well as refueling us promptly. As I sat there with my rotors turning, I noticed quite a few folks with cameras waiting for us to
take off in the superstructure. I asked the petty officer what was going on. He said an Army cobra had crashed into the river the day
before during takeoff and everyone wanted get a photo of it this time. So I told everyone to take it easy on takeoff. We usually are so heavy
that we can only hover at less than 6 inches. Official gross weight of a AH-1G was 9500 lbs, but we usually operated around 10500-10600 lbs.
But now we were taking off more than 30 feet in the air. Needless to say, it was an exciting takeoff as I barely got her flying just above
the water!! Cheated them of their photos that day, but we came back many times after that during the Cambodian operations.
VC Lake was hell of a battle. Sorry so many good aviators and air crewman -- Army and Navy -- did not come home that day. They deserve
our respect and a salute!!
Jim Burch
Crusader33
D Trp 3/5 Air Cav, RVN '70
crusader33@knology.net
james.burch@redstone.army.mil
256-842-7049
DSN788-7049
FAX 256-955-0887
Those Cav guys are a proud bunch, and rightfully so. They called their combined gunship/observer/slick operational units "Pink Teams". I've heard them referred to as "Hunter-Killer Teams". The Guns and Slicks with an Infantry 'Quick Strike' unit would fly at altitude, out of site, close by. The LOH observation helicopters would 'recon' an area by flying at tree-top level, using themselves as bait. When the bad-guys opened up with more than the guys in back with "free 60's" could handle, they popped smoke to mark the targets and peeled off. The Cobras then fell out of the sky on them! Meanwhile if the 'Command and Control' (C&C) decided too many folks were escaping they'd insert the 'grunts' ahead of them for an ambush.
I'm sure they worked it with many variations depending on the situation, but I think this was their SOP.
Now I've got to go back to the website Crusader 33 posted to and read the Navy's account. You can too, by clicking the link at the top of this post. ...Robt.
